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Abstract 
The compelling quality of the Global Change simulation study (Altemeyer, 2003), in which 
high RWA (right-wing authoritarianism)/high SDO (social dominance orientation) 
individuals produced poor outcomes for the planet, rests on the inference that the link 
between high RWA/SDO scores and disaster in the simulation can be generalized to real 
environmental and social situations. However, we argue that studies of the Person × Situation 
interaction are biased to overestimate the role of the individual variability. When variables 
are operationalized, strongly normative items are excluded because they are skewed and 
kurtotic. This occurs both in the measurement of predictor constructs, such as RWA, and in 
the outcome constructs, such as prejudice and war. Analyses of normal linear statistics 
highlight personality variables such as RWA, which produce variance, and overlook the role 
of norms, which produce invariance. Where both normative and personality forces are 
operating, as in intergroup contexts, the linear analysis generates statistics for the sample that 
disproportionately reflect the behavior of the deviant, antinormative minority and direct 
attention away from the baseline, normative position. The implications of these findings for 
the link between high RWA and disaster are discussed. 
 
It is fascinating to read about the simulated world futures run by individuals high in right-wing authoritarianism 
(high RWAs) and individuals high in both RWA and social dominance orientation (SDO) ("Double Highs")—
fascinating, and intensely satisfying. According to Altemeyer (2003), (a) Double High RWA/SDO participants 
have strong, Machiavellian leadership motives; (b) because they are very strongly motivated to acquire power, 
they may be overrepresented among leaders, and particularly among conservative leaders; and (c) when in 
leadership positions, they wreak havoc on out-groups and fail to cooperate prosocially, even when faced by 
common and urgent threats, thereby jeopardizing and eroding in-group positions in the medium- and long-term. 
Speaking as left-wing academics, we find it particularly rewarding to have the depressing state of the modern 
world attributed to a psychologically distant out-group: right-wing politicians. But what does it mean to observe 
that high RWA/SDO minorities are forces for evil? Can world peace be created by screening politicians for low 
RWA/SDO scores? 
Probably not, because social attitudes and behavior are powerfully shaped by social factors. ASAP 
readers indeed may be especially knowledgeable about the moderating effects of situations on personality–
behavior relationships: the Person × Situation interaction. Intergroup research suggests that even dispositional 
pacifists might lead nations to war under the influence of norms—standards or rules for appropriate behavior—
that mandate situational competitiveness or hostility (e.g., Hogg & Turner, 1987; Terry & Hogg, 1996; 
regarding prejudice, see also Billig, 1976; Duckitt, 1983, 1989; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Pettigrew, 1958). 
Indeed, salient social group norms have been specifically observed to moderate the link between prejudice and 
personality variables such as RWA and SDO (Reynolds, Turner, Haslam, & Ryan, 2001; Verkuyten & 
Hagendoorn, 1998). 
Altemeyer's (2003) Global Change Game simulated individuals' evolving responses to environmental 
or social challenges and opportunities. Identifying the predictors of environmental or political or nuclear 
holocausts is an important task. However, if holocausts are understood as the outcomes of norms as well as of 
personality variables, the analysis of individual variability may not meet the challenge of predicting, explaining, 
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or preventing these outcomes. In the present article, it is argued that normative influence in social attitudes and 
behavior is systematically underestimated, undermining the explanatory and predictive power of the research. 
Three aspects of the problem are discussed: (a) a methodological strategy that selects for measures with 
"normal" variance will maximize the role of personality variables, privileging measures that tap unclear or weak 
norms; (b) an analytic strategy that reports normal linear statistics will highlight personality variables, which 
work to maximize variance, and overlook the role of norms, which work to produce invariance; and (c) where 
both normative and personality forces are operating, as in intergroup contexts, the linear analysis generates 
statistics for the sample that disproportionately reflect the behavior of the deviant, antinormative minority and 
direct attention away from the baseline, normative position. Study of the Person × Situation interaction is 
obscured because the situation variables' range is systematically restricted and the asymmetric situational 
invariance is statistically and interpretatively invisible. 
 
The Migrating Content of Constructs in Social Science 
 
Methodological choices in social sciences direct attention away from normative effects when researchers throw 
out or avoid skewed dependent variables on the grounds that population social attitudes and behaviors should be 
normally distributed. Behaviors and attitudes endorsed or rejected at very high base rates are taken to be poor 
targets of study because of the artifactual ceiling or floor effects (see, e.g., Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996: pp. 71–
78). However, the person variance for the dependent variable can be understood to be curvilinearly related to the 
strength of the situational norm. The stronger the norm, the less person variance there is to predict, because 
norms homogenize attitudes and behavior. That is, very normative measures will be low in variance because of 
ceiling effects and high base rates, whereas very antinormative measures will be low in variance because of 
floor effects and low base rates. 
Regardless of personality, few Australians support genocide; most support religious pluralism. If we 
are interested in predicting social holocausts, the existence of this social consensus is important. Yet because 
there is a social consensus, these items are kurtotic and skewed. Therefore, methodological choices ensure that 
measures of the focal variables (e.g., prejudice) exclude the strong norms. With prejudice as a dependent 
variable, for example, with Black Australians as the target group, "Black Australians should be enslaved" might 
be excluded for floor effects; "Black Australians should be allowed to attend school with Whites" might be 
excluded for ceiling effects; and prejudice in 2003 may be operationalized as "Pro-Black affirmative action is 
reverse discrimination." The operationalization also changes over time, although the construct label is the same. 
Thus, aspects of prejudice on which individuals vary within the situation are included in the operationalization 
of the dependent variable, whereas the aspects of prejudice that are normative and homogeneous are 
systematically excluded. 
Individual differences in independent variables such as RWA are also oriented, by definition, to items 
that tap the weak or contested norms of the present. These scale items also change across contexts and time 
under the same construct label: Across a single decade in the RWA scale, items such as "Women should always 
remember the promise they make in the marriage ceremony to obey their husbands" (Altemeyer, 1981) 
disappear, while new items such as "There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse" (reverse scored) 
(Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) become defining features of authoritarianism. By "migrating" to avoid strong 
norms, constructs in social science maximize the variance available for individual-difference explanations. Of 
course, RWA is designed to be a measure of individual variability. Yet the normative historical and between-
context differences (e.g., changing attitudes regarding the status of women) are of great social and theoretical 
importance. Used in the context of predicting or eliminating social problems, a "migrating variance" 
methodological strategy—throwing out normative independent or dependent measures of particular constructs 
as they become increasingly rejected or endorsed and thus more skewed—seems poorly positioned to 
understand historical stability and change. 
 
Invisible Norms and the Analysis of Variance 
 
Once the methodological choices have been made, statistical models also direct attention away from normative 
effects, because researchers learn to analyze variance rather than invariance. Personality produces individual 
differences—that is, variance, which is what the statistical packages look for and report. By contrast, because 
norms constrain attitudes and behavior, the stronger the norm, the less variance there is to predict. Yet there is 
no conventional analysis of invariance. Constants are rarely analyzed (and often unreported) in regression or 
ANOVA models; instead, differences are assessed without consideration of the baselines. Thus, the normative 
level—of prejudice, aggression, militance—is not addressed in the analysis. Moreover, although variance is a 
population parameter as meaningful as means or averages, in principle, in the linear model homogenous 
variance is generally assumed, whereas heterogeneous means are modeled and tested. We know of no statistical 
analysis that reports or tests for invariance across individuals: Tools search for and analyze the linear variance 
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and its predictors, and invariance is a null effect. Variance versus invariance for the same items across time or 
samples is similarly unaddressed. In short, normative effects become analytically invisible. 
 
Asymmetric Correlations?: Deviant Minorities and Normative Majorities 
 
In the final step of interpretation, individual differences are emphasized at the expense of norm-induced 
homogeneity if asymmetric relationships are interpreted as if they were symmetric. As is generally known, 
correlational relationships between normally distributed variables can be interpreted symmetrically: If effort and 
test scores are correlated, high scores reflect high effort, and low scores reflect low effort. However, the 
relationship of a normally distributed independent variable with a skewed dependent measure is asymmetrically 
driven by the outlying tail of the distribution. For example, if a test were extremely easy, effort might be 
unrelated to test score for the majority of the class who score at the ceiling. Yet a significant correlation would 
still be observed if the outliers who scored poorly also had low effort. In this case, the significant but 
asymmetric correlation should be interpreted with caution: Low scores reflect low effort, but high scores do not 
necessarily reflect high effort. 
In the same way, the relationship between a normally distributed personality variable and a skewed 
attitudinal or behavioral social measure is more informative from deviance (the tail of the distribution) to 
personality than from conformity (the ceiling or floor) to personality. Despite this asymmetry, the learned 
assumption of normality may lead researchers to interpret linear tests as evidence of a general relationship. If 
personality–behavior variance is disproportionately driven by deviant minorities, in the context of a norm-
behavior invariance that is analytically invisible but theoretically and socially important, the asymmetry of the 
effect must be articulated in order to accurately explain the behavior. 
 
An Illustration: Norms, Skewness, and Personality–Behavior Effects in Two Australian 
Sample 
 
Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) described correlations of .40 and .50 between RWA and "posse-radical" 
items in this way: "If you ask people whether they would be willing to help locate and arrest [social deviants] 
and then have them tortured or even executed, most subjects say ‘absolutely not.’ But high RWAs answer much 
more equivocally" (p. 115). From this analysis, it seems likely that although those who are equivocal about 
antinormative repression are higher in RWA, rejection of the repression does not require low RWA. Whereas 
deviance is associated with personality, the conformity of the normative majority is unaddressed. To further 
illustrate the implications of asymmetry, we describe existing data sets linking personality variables (RWA and 
SDO) to social variables (Australian pro-White attitudes and support for the exclusion of asylum seekers). We 
reanalyzed the data to provide the correlation between the social and personality variables for the whole sample, 
and for the majority or minority who displayed high and low levels of the dependent variable. Table 1 
summarizes the results and presents some characteristics of each study; Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the asymmetric 
bivariate relationships. 
 
In each data set, significant associations were observed between the personality variables and the 
attitude. RWA predicts pro-White attitudes in one Australian sample; in the other, SDO predicts support for 
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exclusionary treatment of asylum seekers. But a closer examination of the data suggests the presence of two 
effects: one visible and one invisible. Visibly, the variance in attitudes is associated with personality variables. 
White Australians' disagreement that "the White race is the best race" was negatively correlated with RWA, r=–
.34, p= .000 (see also Louis, Terry, & Gad-Harf, 2003). In another data set, Australian voters' support for 
programs to exclude refugee claimants or asylum seekers from Australia was significantly predicted by SDO, r= 
.22, p= .001 (see also Louis, Duck, Terry, Schuller, & Lalonde, 2003). Thus, personality variables produce 
significant and visible effects. 
However, in both studies, scores on the social attitudes were skewed, thus reducing the variance for the 
majority of the sample. The pattern of results suggests that there was a clear normative position on the attitude 
under consideration. This effect is invisible in the analyses and must be inferred from the distribution's 
invariance (which would rarely be reported), unless between-group or cross-context data allow the norm to vary. 
Reference to Figure 1 suggests that although the minority of White Australian students who did not strongly 
disagree that "the White race is the best race" tended to be high in RWA, among a normative majority, RWA 
was less predictive of the social attitude. In fact, for the majority of the sample, the correlation cannot be 
calculated (72% disagree at ceiling), although among the 28% minority who did not strongly reject the 
statement, RWA and social attitudes correlate at –0.19. In a similar vein, inspection of Figure 2 suggests that the 
minority of participants who did not support exclusionary measures for asylum seekers tended to be low in 
SDO, but among the normative majority, SDO was unrelated to the social attitude. The correlation between 
support for exclusion and SDO for the 74% majority of the sample who favored exclusionary measures was only 
.03, versus .13 for the 26% minority position with unfavorable views of exclusionary measures. Note that this 
asymmetry occurs even though in the latter study, the normative position was a right-wing (anti–asylum seeker) 
position. 
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In the present data, then, antinormative racists were systematically higher in RWA, and antinormative 
liberals (with positive attitudes toward asylum seekers) were systematically lower in SDO. But among the 
normative low-prejudice majority for White Australians, RWA was unrelated to prejudice, and among the 
majority with normative negative attitudes toward asylum seekers, SDO was unrelated to support for 
exclusionary measures. Indeed, for the majority of participants in the first data set (72%) and a considerable 
proportion of participants in the second (30%), there was no variance to predict, presumably because of the 
presence of strong social norms constraining the attitudes under consideration. 
It would be common for researchers to make a methodological decision to exclude items like the 
"White race" item from study, because they are too skewed. If the item were to be studied, conventional 
analyses will reflect the variance, leaving the invariance unaddressed. Moreover, in the interpretation of the 
result, the personality–behavior variance would usually be reported and interpreted symmetrically; the 
asymmetric nature of the effect (with the majority adopting a normative position) would rarely be discussed. 
The cumulative effect of these methodological and statistical practices, we argue, may be to systematically 
underestimate the effects of normative influence on important attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. The 
underlying Person × Situation interaction is obscured because the situation variables' range has been restricted 
and the asymmetric situational invariance is statistically and interpretatively invisible. 
 
What If Authoritarians Didn't Rule the World? 
 
Personality research is a critical aspect of the study of social conflict and harmony. It is theoretically and 
socially important to note that conventionalism, submission, and aggression often covary, and that RWA and 
SDO predict prejudice against vulnerable minority groups within any given social structure. Dominant 
authoritarians in critical leadership positions may well wield disproportionate influence for evil; the specific 
illustration in Altemeyer (2003) is both provocative and compelling. However, the study leads us to consider the 
general question of whether predicting relative variance in millions of simulated dead with variance in attitudes 
to premarital sex could be complemented in other research with different types of designs or analyses. What 
kind of model would we develop if we tried to predict and understand real massacres and genocides? Non–
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normally distributed low and high base-rate behaviors and attitudes are of great interest, and the processes that 
lead people to avoid or engage in these actions may not be the same processes that produce variance for the 
normally distributed, moderately endorsed midrange. What kind of Personality × Situation story could we tell if 
we tried to understand the changing relationship between authoritarianism and belief in women's duty to obey 
their husbands? It seems likely that the strategy of avoiding skewed and invariant behavioral and attitudinal 
dependent variables will maximize the impact of individual-difference variables, without explaining or 
predicting normative influence across contexts, time, or behaviors. 
Methodologically, norms that are at present invisible because of within-context, within-group studies 
might be introduced as moderating variables of personality–behavior relationships (e.g., Pettigrew, 1958; Terry, 
Hogg, & Blackwood, 2001). However, it is not clear that norms for many important societal outcomes (e.g., 
nuclear war) could be easily manipulated, and the problem of statistical tools focusing almost exclusively on 
linear variance remains. Statistically, perhaps nonlinear effects such as thresholds might be routinely included in 
social science models. In any case, statistically and theoretically articulating the relationship between normative 
invariance and asymmetric personality–behavior relationships will be a valuable complementary focus in our 
research. People trying to understand and predict nuclear, social, and environmental holocausts must search for 
alternatives to the linear model and the normal distribution. 
Methodologically, statistically, and interpretatively, researchers should be self-conscious about a focus 
on variance and the assumption of symmetric effects. In the study of prejudice and war, analyses might yield a 
different pattern of results or more broad interpretations if they incorporated consideration of meaningful 
skewness or degrees of invariance. If high RWAs can disagree that "the White race is the best race," then the 
evil tendencies of authoritarians can be normatively constrained. And if low-dominance individuals can support 
exclusionary measures for asylum seekers, then maybe even if our leaders weren't authoritarian and 
domineering bigots, normative prejudice and conflict would persist. To understand the relationship between 
authoritarianism and global holocausts, the Person × Situation interaction directs us to consider what attitudes 
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